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PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

AN ALLEGED NEW DISCOVERY IN LOGIC

WHEN a logician openly claims to be the discoverer of a logical character radically revolutionary and hitherto unknown it is fitting and proper and necessary that the alleged new discovery, and the evidence supporting it, should be subjected to careful scrutiny. The purpose of this discussion is to make such an examination. For Professor Dewey has felt himself called upon to enter the logical arena in defense of what he seems to think is a type or kind or form of judgment not sufficiently taken into account by present-day logicians. And he intimates that it has been altogether neglected and ignored by logicians of the past. Such judgments are defined as "propositions relating to *agenda*—to things to do or be done, judgments of a situation as demanding action." He gives such examples as the following: "M. N. should do thus and so, it is better, wiser, more prudent, right, advisable, opportune, expedient, *etc.*, to act thus and so."¹ "He had better consult a physician" is the specific judgment of this type which he uses most to exemplify his theory. That he regards these as constituting a form of judgment distinct from any of the judgment forms usually enumerated by logicians I infer from the criticism which he directs at contemporary logicians for daring to omit this form of judgment. He writes: "Mr. Russell has recently said that of the two parts of logic the first enumerates or inventories the different kinds or forms of propositions. It is noticeable that he does not even mention this kind as a possible kind. Yet it is conceivable that this omission seriously compromises the discussion of other kinds. . . . It is silly to dwell upon the practical importance of judgments of this sort, but not wholly silly to say that their practical importance arouses suspicion as to the grounds of their neglect in discussion of logical forms in general."² These passages clearly imply that in Professor Dewey's mind the judgment of practise should be recognized as a judgment form distinct from any of the judgment forms usually enumerated.

¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 335.

² *Loc. cit.*, pp. 336 ff.

Before considering Professor Dewey's argument on its merits I can not refrain from insisting that justice should be done to Aristotle, the Father of Logic. It is strange that Professor Dewey should have overlooked the famous discussion in the *Nicomachean Ethics* usually entitled *The Doctrine of the Practical Syllogism*.³ Here Aristotle shows very clearly what the application of logic to action is, but he was too good a logician to fall into the trap either of making practicality a unique logical character, or of setting practical syllogisms into a figure to themselves. For he was well aware of the fact that logically speaking they are just like other syllogisms.

Passing now to the argument, it should be noted that Professor Dewey does not make the mistake commonly made by those who advocate the recognition of value-judgments alongside of existential or ordinary judgments, the mistake, namely, of supposing a different origin or source for the value-judgment from that of ordinary theoretical judgment, referring it to the affective-volitional aspect of consciousness rather than to the intelligence. Indeed he expressly and emphatically repudiates this much-worn theory. "I do not mean by practical judgment an alleged type of judgment having a different organ and source from other judgments."⁴ It is, of course, futile to direct the familiar arguments against him which are perfectly valid when aimed at this theory, since they are nullified by this explicit denial.

Nor, on the other hand, does he make the mistake of arguing that all judgment possesses the character *agenda*. To be sure he came dangerously near advocating such a theory of judgment, and I shall presently indicate how this constitutes one serious defect in his argument. That he does stagger along the edge of this precipice is shown by the statement quoted above: "This omission seriously compromises the discussion of other types." For why does it so seriously impair the exposition of other types unless other types are supposed to possess the same character? Of course when pragmatic logic is consistently carried out this is the inevitable conclusion. It is not entirely void of significance that Dr. Schiller should have been moved by the reading of Professor Dewey's discussion to write a rather lengthy comment in which he raises the question whether "as a sheer matter of logical fact, this type is not discoverable in *all* judgments." And he answers it by saying: "It appears to me to be hardly possible to give anything but an affirmative answer to this question."⁵ But Professor Dewey avoids this consequence by refusing to carry his theory to its logical conclusion. He writes: "I do not profess, of

³ Bks. VI., 9 and VII., 5. For a discussion of the theory see Grant, *Ethics of Aristotle*.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 335.

⁵ This JOURNAL, Vol. XII., p. 684.

course, to have shown that such is the case for all propositions; that is a matter which I have not discussed."⁶ But for the benefit of Dr. Schiller, who has attempted to show this to be the case for all propositions, and for the guidance of Professor Dewey, should he ever be inclined to make a similar attempt, I may refer in passing to Mr. Bradley's trenchant and hitherto unanswered criticism of Bain's theory of practical belief.⁷ For Bain actually anticipated pragmatic logic by advocating the identical notion of judgment which Dr. Schiller has openly espoused and which Professor Dewey has covertly implied, which shows, incidentally, that James was not far wrong when he gave to his *Pragmatism* the sub-title "A new name for some old ways of thinking." In so far then as Professor Dewey is guilty of holding that all judgments are judgments of practise he may be referred to this criticism by Mr. Bradley. I am here concerned only with his contention that judgments of practise are entitled to be considered a unique type of judgment, and to be given a status like that of any other judgment form.

Professor Dewey bases his argument upon the fact that practical judgments have a unique sort of subject-matter. He mentions six ways in which their content is supposed to differ from that of ordinary theoretical judgments. Before I finish this discussion I propose to consider severally these supposedly unique features of the subject-matter of judgments of practise. But before proceeding to do that, I wish to point out certain latent ambiguities and misconceptions which seem to me seriously to undermine, if they do not entirely destroy, the whole edifice of his argument.

First of all let me develop the point which I mentioned and promised presently to consider. I have said that Professor Dewey barely avoided the pitfall into which the less wary Dr. Schiller fell, the pitfall of arguing that all judgments are practical. But he does go so far as to suggest that this may be the case. "I have," he writes, "at least ruled out any purely dialectic proof that the *nature* of knowledge as such forbids entertaining the hypothesis that the import—indirect if not direct—of all logical propositions is some difference to be brought about. The road is at least cleared for a more unprejudiced consideration of this hypothesis on its own merits."⁸ By merely making this suggestion Professor Dewey implies that practicality can constitute the differentia of judgment, in general, at the same time that it is that characteristic which marks off one form of judgment from other forms. Unquestionably there lurks here an ambiguity. It would seem that practicality must either

⁶ *Loc. cit.*, p. 389.

⁷ *Principles of Logic*, pp. 18 ff. Cf. Bain, *Emotions and the Will*, Chapter on "Belief."

⁸ *Loc. cit.*, p. 389.

be used as the differentia of all judgment or as that characteristic which distinguishes one form of judgment from other forms. It argues an insufficient analysis of the facts to proceed on the assumption that practicality can be used in both ways. If any one says, as Dr. Schiller says and as Professor Dewey suggests, that all judgments are judgments of practise, then he would seem to be logically bound to admit that judgments of practise do not constitute a distinct judgment form. And if any one says, as Professor Dewey says, that the judgment of practise is a unique judgment form, then he would seem to be logically bound to admit that practicality is not a distinctive characteristic of all judgments. For in order to distinguish one form of judgment from another it is necessary that there should be some respect in which they differ. But if all judgments without exception are practical, one judgment form could not differ from another in respect of practicality unless it were held that judgment forms are to be determined by degree of practicality. But to say that one form of judgment is different from others by virtue of the fact that it possesses the characteristics which constitute practicality is quite a different thing from saying that judgment forms are to be determined by the degree of practicality which they exhibit. And since Professor Dewey maintains the former and not the latter there is a latent contradiction involved in his suggestion that all judgments may possess the characteristics constituting practicality.

A second misconception which I find in Professor Dewey's discussion is the notion that this form of judgment is to be determined solely by reference to subject-matter or content and yet is to be recognized alongside of those which have been determined in an entirely different way. He says that he means by a judgment of practise "simply a kind of judgment having a specific type of subject-matter." But the usual way of determining what form a judgment has is to abstract from the subject-matter and consider the formal arrangement of the content. Or to state it more technically and hence more accurately, the usual method of determining judgment forms is to consider the degree of logical stability or consistency which is exhibited by the content regardless of what that content may be. Accordingly the same judgment form may serve to embody various kinds of subject-matter, and on the other hand the same subject-matter may be embodied in different judgment forms. Now if Professor Dewey wishes to devise a new method of determining what the forms of judgment are, a method, let us say, based upon kinds of content or subject-matter or degree of practicality, he is certainly at liberty to do so. But it is beyond a doubt incumbent upon him to justify this new method before the forum of logic. This he has not even attempted to do. Yet he presumes to ask those who have deter-

mined the forms of judgment by reference to degree of logical stability to include among the forms which they have so determined one which he has determined in an entirely different way. This is an unjust demand and such a procedure would be highly impractical. It could not come to good, but would only result in a hopeless confusion in the theory of judgment forms. It might, indeed, be just to make such a demand if judgment forms were like planets—indifferent to the method by which they are determined. It is perhaps true that the planet Neptune was justly entitled to be included among the planets when it had been discovered by induction and before it was discovered by observation. But determining judgment forms is not analogous to discovering planets. You get a wholly new and radically different set when you use the usual method from what you would get if you were to employ the method suggested by Professor Dewey. Consequently it is altogether unfair to ask logicians to include this bastard form among those they recognize as legitimate.

A third nest of ambiguities is to be found in his loose use of the term judgment. I think that it can not consistently and successfully be denied that Professor Dewey uses the term in at least two radically different senses. Moreover, the term judgment and the term proposition are seemingly used synonymously. In some contexts he seems to mean by judgment or proposition the psychical act of an agent reaching a decision relative to the course of action to pursue in a determinate situation. It is so used when he writes "the proposition is itself a factor in the completion of the situation, in carrying it forward to its conclusion."⁹ But in other contexts he identifies judgment with the transformation of the given. It is so used when he speaks of practical judgments implying "the seeming paradox of a judgment whose proper subject-matter is its own determinate formation."¹⁰ Now this transformation of the given is the movement toward logical stability and consistency, the dialectical movement of Hegel, the movement toward concrete universality of Dr. Bosanquet with the one radical and fundamental difference that Professor Dewey identifies this process of transformation with temporal transition—the evolutionary process of Herbert Spencer. But if he had correctly interpreted Hegel he would have known that the reconciliation (*Aufhebung*) of two such opposites as the Hegelian dialectical movement and the Spencerian evolutionary process is not to be attained by simply identifying one with the other. I shall consider this second theory of judgment later.

Of course Professor Dewey denies that he is using the term judgment to mean a psychic act or state. But what else can he possibly

⁹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 338.

¹⁰ *Loc. cit.*, p. 369.

mean when he talks about the proposition or judgment being a factor in the completion of the situation which is supposed to constitute the subject-matter of judgment (in the second sense)? I quote his defense because it illustrates most excellently another ambiguity in his use of the term judgment—the ambiguity, namely, of using the term in its general signification in a context which demands its use in the specific sense of some definite judgment. *Judgment* is different from *a judgment* or *the judgment*, and to omit the article in a context where consistency demands that it should be used, for no apparent reason except perhaps to avoid the consequence to which consistency would lead, is manifestly unfair. He writes: “But (to obviate misunderstanding) this does not mean that some psychic state or act makes the difference in things. In the first place the subject-matter of the judgment is a change to be brought about; and in the second place this subject-matter does not become an *object* until the judgment has issued in act. It is the act which makes the difference, but nevertheless the act is but the complete object of judgment and the judgment is complete as a judgment only in the act.”¹¹ If the act is but the complete object of judgment, it is pertinent to ask: “Of what judgment?” Why has the article been omitted here when it is employed to qualify every other usage of the term judgment in this passage? It is astonishing to what ambiguity the omission of the article in this case leads. With the article the statement could easily be shown to be self-contradictory. For it would mean that an *actual* act is a part of the subject-matter of a judgment whose subject-matter is constituted by the incomplete situation which the act completes, or that an actual act is a part of the subject-matter of a judgment which conditions it. But the omission of the article makes the statement appear plausible. Yet is it fair to omit it? All through this passage Professor Dewey is talking about a definite judgment and a definite situation and not about judgment in general. Consequently I must insist that there is no justification for using the term in its general signification, and that the use of the article is a desideratum in this context.

Returning now to the dominant definition of judgment, I want to show that on the basis of this definition the examples which Professor Dewey gives are really not judgments at all. As I said, he means by judgment in general the actual temporal development which takes place in the objective field. By a judgment or the judgment he means some one situation taken from the moment it begins as a situation until it is completed by being met by some course of action. During this time, the length of which may vary almost indefinitely, the given or whatever content was there when the situation began as a

¹¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 388.

situation is transformed. *This process of transformation in any definite situation is the judgment or a judgment.* When the situation is somehow met you get the complete subject-matter, and while it is being met you have an incomplete subject-matter, but the whole process is *the or a judgment.* Now I submit that upon this basis such a judgment as "He had better consult a physician" can not be a judgment. For it certainly is not the whole process of transformation of a given into a completed subject-matter, *but only one stage of that process.* Hence it can not be a judgment according to Professor Dewey's most consistent definition of a judgment. And before it could be such Professor Dewey would have to mean by a judgment or the judgment some definite stage in this process of transformation and not the whole of that part of the process constituted by the situation. Then the situation itself would constitute what I should call an inferential whole—a complex of judgments. But even this important modification would not be sufficient. Professor Dewey must learn, as Mr. Russell has learned, that "both in thought and in feeling, to realize the unimportance of time is the gate of wisdom."¹² That is to say, he must cease thinking of the process as a temporal process. To be sure, time is included as one of the factors, but if it is regarded as a temporal movement then one is logically committed to the view that each fleeting moment constitutes a new stage in the situation and hence a new judgment, whereas the situation may and often does remain essentially the same, so far as logical development is concerned, through several moments. And this proves that the element of temporal transition is a secondary factor, and that the logical development is the all-important aspect of the situation. So far as I am able to judge, Professor Dewey could not account for any judgment of practise apart from some such modification of his theory of judgment as I have here indicated.

The last general ambiguity which I shall mention is connected with his theory of judgment and is closely connected with the defects which I have just indicated. If I may turn an apt phrase of Professor Dewey against himself, it is the "prior dogma" to the effect that it makes sense in logic to speak of a judgment as though it were independent and capable of existing while having only a part of its subject-matter. A further implication of this dogma is that the judgment continues to be the same judgment while its content develops. I call this a dogma because nowhere do I find anything in the nature of a proof that judgment is of this nature. Take this sentence as a specimen of the ambiguity I have in mind: "A practical proposition affects the subject-matter for better or worse, for it is a judgment as to the condition (the thing to be done) of the exist-

¹² *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, p. 167.

ence of the complete subject-matter."¹³ I wonder why Professor Dewey did not say "A practical proposition affects *its* subject-matter for better or worse because it is a judgment as to the condition of the existence of *its* complete subject-matter." To change *the* to *its* is the only way I can make any sense out of this passage, but when the change is made we find this dogma staring us in the face. We have a practical proposition with only a part of its content, getting in some mysterious way inside of that portion of its content which is present and thereby helping to produce that part which is not yet in existence, and yet retaining its identity throughout this prestidigitating to the extent that it can be called the same judgment. How can this be? When in logic we speak of the subject-matter of a judgment we mean its *complete* subject-matter and not a part of its subject-matter. If it is a judgment as to the condition of the existence of the complete subject-matter, it is the complete subject-matter of *another judgment* and not its own subject-matter. There is no difference between a judgment and its subject-matter, and the subject-matter of every judgment is as complete as that judgment requires. Here we have the identification of the judgment which conditions another judgment with the judgment which it conditions. When the subject-matter varies or gets completed the judgment changes. Or, to put it as it should be put, the least perceptible development toward logical completeness in the subject-matter of a judgment always necessitates the making of a new judgment embodying the change, indeed always constitutes a new judgment embodying the change. Consequently it is highly misleading to speak of a practical proposition affecting the or its subject-matter for better or worse, because when the subject-matter is once affected for better or worse it is no longer the subject-matter of that, but of another, judgment.

It is not easy to convict so skilful a writer as Professor Dewey of so flagrant an ambiguity and I am not sure that I have made my meaning clear. It is only when you change *the* to *its* in the statement quoted that the point becomes obvious. But there is one passage which is charged with the same dogma where a change of language is not needed to make it clear to the reader. He writes: "The judgment will be a judgment (and not a chance reaction) in the degree in which it takes for its intervening subject-matter the value-status of various objects."¹⁴ The phrase *intervening subject-matter* can not be interpreted in any other way than as meaning that the same judgment has different subject-matter at one time from what it has at another. In some contexts Professor Dewey is more guarded

¹³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 340.

¹⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 362.

and seeks to avoid the difficulty by holding to the view just advocated, the view, namely, that the judgment is identical with the subject-matter and that a change in one is equivalent to a change in the other. But he succeeds in avoiding one ambiguity only by falling into another. Thus when he says, "The judgment is complete as a judgment only in the act,"¹⁵ he is taking this position. But what is a judgment which is not complete as a judgment? Is it half or one third or one sixth a judgment? Just how much of a judgment is it anyway? Merely asking these questions is a sufficient refutation of such a statement. Every judgment is complete as a judgment. If it is not complete as a judgment, if it does not possess the differentia of judgment, it simply is not a judgment. The judgment "He had better consult a physician," to use Professor Dewey's example, is a complete judgment and has all the ear-marks of a complete judgment. The act of consulting a physician has nothing to do with the completing of this judgment. The judgment which embodies that act is a different judgment and would be expressed so: "He is consulting a physician."

I propose now, somewhat belatedly, I admit, since this discussion of general ambiguities has extended itself far beyond what I intended at the outset, to take up in order the six characteristics which Professor Dewey mentions as constituting the uniqueness and practicality of judgments of practise. I shall show (1) that some of these are possessed by all judgments, (2) that some are possessed by a larger group of judgments than those which he denominates judgments of practise, and (3) that one is not a characteristic of any judgment. Having done that, I shall show what form of judgment these judgments he mentions really are. That should be enough to put a quietus to the theory that the judgment of practise is a unique form of judgment.

I. "Their subject-matter implies an incomplete situation."¹⁶ If this means that the content of any judgment expands, when reflected upon, into the content of a more inclusive judgment, then this is a characteristic of all judgments. For it is one of the distinctive features of judgment that every judgment, whenever it is reflected upon, expands into a more inclusive one. But if Professor Dewey is here referring to the fact that certain judgments are contingent because their subject-matter includes a temporal element, then it can be answered that he himself nullifies the force of this contention by referring a little further on to the fact that there are *other* contingent judgments besides those which possess the other five characteristics of judgments of practise. In the course of his discussion of the sec-

¹⁵ *Loc. cit.*, p. 388.

¹⁶ *Loc. cit.*, p. 337.

ond characteristic he says distinctly that practical judgments are distinct "from another kind of contingent proposition, namely, that which has the form 'He has started for your house:' . . . The unfinishedness of the given is implied in this proposition, but it is not implied that the proposition is a factor in determining its completion."¹⁷ In other words, unfinishedness is a characteristic of *contingent judgments*, and the mere fact that the subject-matter of a given judgment implies an incomplete situation is admittedly not enough to constitute it a judgment of practise, and is not even unique.

II. "Their subject-matter implies that the proposition is itself a factor in the completion of the situation, carrying it forward to its conclusion."¹⁸ Here he uses the term proposition instead of judgment, but, as I said above, I have searched in vain for a distinction, and hence consider it just to infer that they mean the same for Professor Dewey. And in order to make the sentence refer to one judgment instead of to several, I consider it just to substitute the phrase *the subject-matter of a practical proposition* for the phrase *their subject-matter*. And of course Professor Dewey (as I pointed out above) thinks that the whole situation in its completed form constitutes the subject-matter of the judgment. Rewriting the sentence embodying these changes, all of which are certainly legitimate, we get the following enlightening result: "The subject-matter of a practical judgment implies that the practical judgment is itself a factor in the completion of its subject-matter." I submit that in order for this to mean anything the term *practical judgment* must have a different connotation in the latter to what it has in the former context. In the former case it is the judgment of logic and is like any other logical judgment. In the latter case it is a psychical act and as such has no proper place in logic. A judgment is identical with the whole which ties the parts of its subject-matter together, or, to express it more accurately, with the whole which is constituted by its subject-matter, and for that very reason it can never be a factor in or a part of its subject-matter. A whole can never become a part in the whole which it is. Consequently when Professor Dewey speaks of the practical judgment or proposition being a factor in the completion of the subject-matter, he must mean by the term judgment or proposition some psychical act and not a logical judgment. Otherwise the statement is wholly meaningless and self-contradictory.

III. "A practical proposition affects the subject-matter for better or worse, for it is a judgment as to the condition (the thing to be done) of the existence of the complete subject-matter."¹⁹ The same

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*, p. 339.

¹⁸ *Loc. cit.*, p. 338.

¹⁹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 340.

criticism applies here that applies to number II. I have also criticized this passage at length above in the discussion of Professor Dewey's "prior dogma."

IV. "The practical proposition is binary."²⁰ I must confess to a failure to understand what Professor Dewey is driving at in his discussion of this point. I think others must agree with me in hoping that he will soon make this clearer. Now, of course, the ordinary hypothetical and disjunctive forms of judgment are also binary, if binary means simply a judgment embodying two explicit judgments within its subject-matter. And if binary means complexity it is a characteristic of all judgments as is admitted by all logicians. There is nothing especially unique in the fact that a judgment is binary. Some judgments are even infinite. Indeed, some of the examples of Professor Dewey, if carefully analyzed into their constituents, would be found to embody hundreds of other judgments. I can see nothing here that can rightly be claimed to be a unique feature of judgments of practise.

V. The practical judgment is both factual and hypothetical. As early as 1885, in his *Knowledge and Reality*, Dr. Bosanquet advanced and defended with admirable lucidity the thesis that these two aspects are not antagonistic, but reciprocal, and that *both are present in varying degrees* in all judgment. He developed this thesis at length in his masterly *Logic*. He has recently strongly emphasized it in his Gifford Lectures.

VI. "Their truth or falsity is constituted by the issue."²¹ Let it be said forthwith that this is not a characteristic of any judgment whatever. Here we have the prior dogma creeping in again. The judgment is thought of as remaining the same while its content or subject-matter goes on to completion, rendering the judgment true or false according to its issue. I have already made it clear that this is an unproved and unprovable assumption. One needs only to make an unprejudiced appeal to the man in the street, the favorite judge of pragmatists, to learn that the truth or falsity of such a judgment as "He had better consult a physician" does not depend upon the issue in any sense of the word. For every man in the street, who knows anything at all, knows that the truth or falsity of this judgment depends upon the actual state of the man's health at the time the judgment is made, together with a generalization from the experience of mankind to the effect that physicians are able to help men who are ill. All of this is a part of the content of the judgment—it is the ground which determines the truth or falsity of the judgment. If the man's health is bad he had better consult the best physician he knows and the statement is true. If his health is good there is no

²⁰ *Loc. cit.*, p. 340.

²¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 346.

need of his consulting a physician and the judgment is false. The truth or falsity depends upon the underlying ground, supposedly known by the one who makes the judgment. And this is true of all practical judgments.

The more one studies the examples given by Professor Dewey the more the conviction will grow upon him that they are all hypothetical or conditional judgments, although stated in a way which disguises this character. "He had better consult a physician" should be stated "If he is ill he had better consult a physician." If he wants such and such he had better do so and so, or it is more expedient, opportune, *etc.*, to do so and so. On careful examination the form of judgments of practise turns out to be, not a new form at all, but the old friend of logicians—the conditional form of judgment.

In disposing of the judgment of practise I have at the same time disposed of the value-judgment, since Professor Dewey admits that the latter is a species of the former. But there are two ambiguities in his discussion of this subject which should be briefly considered if this refutation is to be complete.

At the beginning of his discussion of the value-judgment Professor Dewey says: "The *experience* of a good and the *judgment* that something is a value of a certain kind and amount, have been almost inextricably confused."²² And he goes somewhat into detail to prove that from Descartes on this has been the case. That this is an important distinction I am not disposed to deny, and I am mainly in agreement with his polemic against this vicious confusion. But what I can not understand is why Professor Dewey, a little further on, should make the identical confusion he here very properly condemns. He writes: "To judge value is to engage in instituting a determinate value where none is given."²³ But if we are to avoid begging the question as to the meaning of value, "to engage in instituting a determinate value where none is given" is the only meaning that the "experience of a good" can have. The experience of a good is identical with the experience which constitutes a value, and hence with what Professor Dewey calls "instituting a determinate value where none is given." But this is to judge value according to Professor Dewey. Consequently he is guilty of failing to hold fast to a distinction, the fundamental importance of which he himself admits.

Professor Dewey defines a value-judgment as one having goods and bads for its subject-matter. But a little further on he says that the good or bad in question (although he calls it the value in this context) is "not anything previously given, but is something to be given by future action."²⁴ And this is equivalent to a denial of the

²² *Loc. cit.*, p. 349.

²³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 368.

²⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 361.

possibility of a value-judgment on the basis of Professor Dewey's own definition. For the value never comes into being until after the judgment, if it is something to be given by future action, and so the value-judgment can never have a determinate content or subject-matter. In that case only the judgment which has for its content the actually existing value could be called a value-judgment. But to say that the value in question is something to be given by future action precludes that possibility. According to Professor Dewey's own account of the matter a value-judgment would be a judgment without a content. And, to adapt a phrase of Meinong, such judgments belong to that class of objects of which it is true that they are not.

"The question is simply whether the nature of things can interest us for its own sake, apart from the concrete endeavor to transform our lives and their world. When once the conception of a world which possesses being beyond our own has distinguished itself from the tentative endeavor to supply our wants, it seems inevitable that we should be interested in such a world purely from the point of view of what it is, if only because we have the idea of it, which necessarily aspires to complete itself."²⁵ If these words could be written across the face of every treatise on pragmatism, I am persuaded that they would prove an unerring guide to the reader on his pilgrimage through the maze of that pathless wilderness. I do not say that pragmatism is a wilderness in the sense that it contains no truth, but that the reader will miss the full import of the truth it does contain if he have not such instruction for his interpreter.

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CONCERNING NOVELTIES IN LOGIC: A REPLY TO MR. ROBINSON

I AM indebted to Mr. Robinson's paper for an opportunity to clarify certain points in my treatment of practical judgments. Before coming to the specific matters wherein I hope to be able to clear up some misconceptions, I shall say a word about my reason for passing over most of the criticisms of Mr. Robinson. I find it impossible to join issues, as the lawyers say. Although Mr. Robinson is discussing alleged novelties, he resorts at many points to restating my positions in terms of older views to which he seems committed, and then condemning them because they do not conform. Let me point to a specific instance. I have spoken of practical judgments as entailing a change of the given, and claimed that the

²⁵ Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality*, p. 53.